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SCIENCE FICTION NO MORE: CYBER WARFARE AND THE UNITED STATES

CassandraM Kirsch*
ABSTRACT
Faced with the increased propensity for cyber tools to damage state
computer networks and power grids with the click of a mouse,
politicians and academics from around the world have called for the
creation of a Geneva Convention equivalent in cyberspace. Yet,
members of United Nations Security Council continue to disagree as to
what cyber activities might rise to the level of an armed attack under
the existing Law of Armed Conflict. Activities once limited to cyber
espionage, and outside the reach of international law, are now the very
same tools utilized in cyber operations to disable state communications
and wreak havoc on state infrastructure. Wars, traditionally waged
between nations and clearly defined groups, can now be fought behind
the veil of anonymity inherent of the Internet. While acts of war have
yet to happen openly on the Internet, accusations have already been
made against Russia for the 2007 cyber attacks on Estonia and against
Israel for the Stuxnet worm unleashed on Iran's nuclear reactors. Just
as aerial bombing and nuclear arms revolutionized the battlefield, cyber
attacks, and the mechanisms behind them, stand poised as the next
evolution in weapons of war and any multilateral treaty must take
these facts into consideration.
INTRODUCTION
Throughout history, technology has revolutionized the manner in
which wars are fought. In the eighteenth century, gunpowder brought
an end to the days of castles and knights, ushering in a period of
battalions and infantrymen. Two hundred years later, the invention of
the aircraft gave rise to the Hague Rules of Air Warfare after the
widespread destruction caused by strategic bombing campaigns during
the First World War. The atrocities wrought by the atom bomb at
Hiroshima and Nagasaki still burn in the memories of many and is
responsible for the proliferation of espionage and intelligence gathering
continuing to this day in our international community. Now, at the
dawn of the twenty-first century, information technology stands to once
again change the landscape of war. While the Internet transformed
society in the nineties by allowing computer users to access information
across the globe with the click of a mouse, the spread of information
technology comes at a cost. The more people become dependent on the
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Internet, and the more data we move from paper to digital format, then
the more vulnerable our society becomes to a cyber attack.
Formerly the substance of science fiction, cyber warfare is one of
the most serious national security threats in recent years. Cyber
warfare covers the doctrine regarding the tactics, techniques, and
procedures of Computer Network Operations (CNO) including attacks,
defense, and exploitation, plus the new aspect of social engineering.'
While the technology used in cyber warfare has been traditionally
characteristic of espionage activities in the last twenty years, this same
technology is capable of creating real damage to a nation-state. In 2007,
Estonia suffered the first ever reported state-wide incident of cyber
assault when Estonia's banks, online newspapers, and government
communications were shut down for two weeks by a group of Russian
hackers who were believed to be tied to the Kremlin. 2 One of the most
wired societies in the world, the people of Estonia quickly turned to the
streets in riot, leaving at least one person dead and 150 people injured. 3
Similar attacks predated the weeks leading up to the 2008 Georgian
bombings by Russia, but it was not until the United States Department
of Defense ("DoD") suffered a massive compromise of military defense
networks that the United States issued a Cyberspace Policy Review and
established the United States Cyber Command ("USCYBERCOM") to
protect DoD networks. 4

* J.D., University of Denver Sturm College of Law (2013); B.A., The University of Texas
(2008). Cassandra M. Kirsch is a 2013 Juris Doctorate candidate at the University of
Denver Sturm College of Law pursuing studies in the areas of information privacy law
and Internet law. The author would like to extend special thanks to Professor John T.
Soma, the Executive Director of the University of Denver Privacy Foundation, for his
encouragement, mentorship, and support of her research on the implications of cyber
warfare and cyber crime on international law.
1. STEPHEN NORTHCUTT, Foreword to CYBER WARFARE: TECHNIQUES, TACTICS AND
TOOLS FOR SECURITY PRACTITIONERS xx (JASON ANDRESS & STEVE WINTERFELD, 2011).

2. See War in the Fifth Domain, ECONOMIST, July 3, 2010, at 25, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/16478792; Noah Shachtman, Kremlin Kids: We Launched
the Estonian Cyber War, WIRED (Mar. 11, 2009), http://www.wired.com/danger
room/2009/03/pro-kremlin-gro. A Pro-Kremlin youth group took responsibility for the
attacks on Estonia in 2007. However, the group has a track record of conducting
operations on behalf of the government.
3. Estonia Hit by "Moscow Cyber War," BBC NEWS, http://news.bb.co.uk/2/hi/
europe/6665145.stm (last updated May 17, 2007).
4. See William J. Lynn III, Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon's Cyber
Strategy, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 2010, at 97, available at www.foreignaffairs.com
articles.66552/william-j-lynn-iiildefending-a-new-domain;
US Needs 'Digital Warfare
Force," BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hiltechnology /8033440.stm (last updated May
5, 2009). In what was the most significant United States military computer data breach to
date, an infected flash drive was inserted into a United States military laptop at a base in
the Middle East and the code on the flash drive uploaded itself onto a network run by U.S.
Central Command and transferred data to servers controlled by foreign intelligence
agencies. The code resulted in "Operation Buckshot Yankee," a 14-month effort to remove
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Despite various initial steps to deter a massive cyber attack on DoD
networks, the United States is largely unprepared to respond to an act
of cyber warfare. In fact, the United States military does not even have
a definition for cyber warfare nor does the legal community understand
how it applies to legal norms, specifically the Law of Armed Conflict. 5
The lack of a definition of cyber warfare is especially problematic as the
President, in responding to a cyber attack must first determine whether
such an attack rises to the level of an "armed attack," and thus justifies
self-defense. However, much of what transpires in the cyber realm does
not resemble traditional military threats. Whether it is appropriate to
characterize cyber attacks as "weapons, means or methods of warfare"
and subject them to legal review is an issue because the legal
architecture for the Law of Armed Conflict is founded on the concept of
traditional military threats.
This paper focuses not only on the current state of the law
regarding cyber warfare, but also what cyber warfare could and should
be. Part I looks at the nature and history of cyber attacks to provide an
understanding of their capabilities as weapons of war as compared to
espionage. Part II examines the applicability of the Law of Armed
Conflict to cyber attacks, including how the elements of proportionality,
attribution, and necessity apply to the most common forms of cyber
attacks. Part III discusses how cyber warfare is currently being
addressed by the United States, the recent proposals for an
international treaty on cyber warfare, and the obstacles to establishing
a multilateral international treaty. Finally, Part IV looks ahead to the
future of American civil liberties post-normalization of cyber warfare.
I. THE NATURE AND HISTORY OF CYBER ATTACKS: WEAPONS OF WAR OR
ESPIONAGE?

In the last decade, the rate of cyber attacks increased
exponentially, along with their propensity for actual harms. Faced with
the growing reality of cyber attacks from foreign state actors, talk of a
Geneva Convention equivalent for cyber space made headlines in the
news and at academic conferences in 2010 and 2011.6 Politicians and
the code from all networks. See also Kim Zetter, The Return of the Worm that Ate the
Pentagon, WIRED (Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/12/wormpentagon/#more-66316.
5. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN
CYBERSPACE, 2-4 (2011), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf.
While the Pentagon has concluded that computer sabotage may constitute an act of war in
its first formal cyber strategy report, the report does not detail what kind of cyber attacks
justify the use of force.
6. See, e.g., KARL FREDERICK RAUSCHER & ANDREY KOROTKOv, EASTWEST INST.,
WORKING TOWARDS RULES FOR GOVERNING CYBER CONFLICT: RENDERING THE GENEVA
AND HAGUE CONVENTIONS IN CYBERSPACE 6-14 (2011), available at http://www.isn
.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications[Detaill/ots591=0c54e3b3-le9c-bele-2c24a6a8c70

2012

CYBER WARFARE AND THE UNITED STATES

623

academics alike agree that a treaty would lessen the chance of a real
cyber war, arguing the world is now in the early stages of a Cyber Arms
Race.7 In evaluating how domestic and international law might be used
by the United States in response to cyber attacks, the international
legal community must first discern the nature, purpose, and scope of
cyber attacks. While the use of terms like "war" and "attacks" espouse
an offensive military nature, threats to our national computer systems
frequently fall under the category of espionage due to their data
gathering nature. 8 Espionage, while punishable under domestic laws, is
not listed as a crime by the International Court of Justice. Rather, the
International Court of Justice reserves the term crime against
international law for acts of aggressive war, serious war crimes or
crimes against humanity, all of which presume harm to citizens to a
nation-state. 9 The establishment of any sort of international regime,
consequently, turns on delineating cyber activities that are used as
weapons versus those limited to state espionage.
Although cyber tools used for espionage activities are often the
same tools used to attack a nation's computer networks, acts of cyber
warfare deviate from their espionage counterparts by going beyond
compromising a computer network.10 Rather than passively monitor
state activities on a computer network or copy data,11 a cyber attack
actively "penetrates another nation's computer systems or networks for
the purposes of causing damage or disruption."1 2 While the United
States military has yet to settle on official definitions for both cyber

60233&lng-en&id=127333; Bruce Schneier, It Will Soon Be Too Late to Stop the
Cyberwars, LONDON FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 2, 2010, at 9, available at
http://www.ft.comlintl/cms/s/0/f863fb4c-fe53-1ldf-abac-00144feab49a.html; Maggie Shiels,
Cyber War Threat Exaggerated Claims Security Expert, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.co
.uk/news/technology-12473809 (last updated Feb. 16, 2011). Cyber warfare and its
relation to the Geneva Convention was a popular topic at the 2011 RSA Security
Conference in San Francisco and the East West Institute has conducted a joint report
between Russian and American scholars to define rules of cyber warfare based on the
Geneva Convention. Although he has argued in the past that the threat of cyber war is
exaggerated, IT Security Expert Bruce Schneier says that the Geneva Conventions need
to be updated to manage the current reality of cyber war and cyber attacks.

7. Hamish Barwick, Global Cyber War Treaties Urgently Needed: Bruce Schneier,
COMPUTERWORLD (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.computerworld.com.au/article/406751/global
cyber wartreaties.urgently-needed-bruceschneier.
8. See JEFFREY T. RICHELSON, Espionage, in THE READER'S COMPANION TO MILITARY
HISTORY 156-57 (Robert Cowley & Geoffrey Parker eds., 1996).
9. See LAWRENCE MALKIN, Genocide, in THE READER'S COMPANION TO MILITARY
HISTORY 181 (Robert Cowley & Geoffrey Parker eds., 1996).
10. See JEFFREY CARR & LEWIS SHEPHERD, INSIDE CYBER WARFARE: MAPPING THE
CYBER UNDERWORLD 1-5 (2009); RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR
228-32 (2010); RICHARD STIENNON, SURVIVING CYBERWAR 20 (2010).
11. STIENNON, supra note 10, at 20-22.
12. CLARKE & KNAKE, supranote 10, at 6.

624

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 40:4

attacks and cyber warfare, 13 the DoD recently adopted an effects-based
approach, or consequence-based model, for determining when a cyber
activity becomes a cyber attack. 14 Under the current approach by the
DoD, the damage caused by the activity to computer networks and
infrastructure is compared with the consequences of traditional armed
attacks. 15 In other words, when the effect of a cyber attack is analogous
to those that would invoke U.N. Charter terms of "armed attack," then
the cyber operation rises to the level of an armed attack. For example, if
a cyber attack takes critical state infrastructure, such as an electricity
grid offline or a dam, offline and collateral damage spills over into the
civilian realm, then the cyber attack would likely count as an armed
attack. 16 On the other hand, a cyber operation that interferes with
intelligence activities shares more similarities with espionage activities
than the kinetic effects of armed attacks. Recently, NATO also adopted
the effects-approach, concluding in an expert report led by Madeline
Albright that a cyber attack on the critical infrastructure of a NATO
country may equate to an armed attack and justifies retaliation.' 7
Despite support of this approach by the United States and NATO,
Russia and China have both rejected the effects-approach in favor of a
broad definition of cyber warfare that encompasses any use of a
computer technology to wage an attack on another country, including
online acts to undermine the political and social harmony of the state.' 8
13. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 5, at 2-4.
14. See id. at 3-4. The Department of Defense refers to cyber attacks as cyber threats,
stating adversaries may seek to "exploit, disrupt, deny, and degrade the networks and
systems that DoD depends on." Also, cyber threats include "destructive action[s]" that
threaten to destroy or degrade networks, as well as attacks on both military targets and
critical civilian infrastructure. See also NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW
AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBER ATTACK CAPABILITIES
(WILLIAM A. OWENS, et al. eds., 2009); U.S ARMY TRAINING & DOCTRINE COMMAND, THE
UNITED STATES ARMY CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS CONCEPT CAPABILITY PLAN 2016-2028, at
67 (2010), available at http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-7-8.pdf.
15. Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attacks and the Use of Force in
International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
885, 913-14 (1999). This approach appears to draw on the kinetic-effect approach coined
by Michael Schmitt. In an attempt to resolve the definitional problem of armed attack,
Schmitt removes economic and political coercion by focusing on the kinetic effects of the
cyber attacks on the actual nation-state.
16. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE 196 (4th ed. 2005).
International Legal Scholar Yoram Dinstein agrees with the effects-approach. Dinstein
argues that what counts in determining whether an electronic computer network attack
rises to the level of an armed attack under the U.N. Charter is the consequence of the
assault. In his opinion, shutting down computers that control dams and causing widescale flooding that results in casualties is the equivalent of an armed attack.
17. N. Atlantic Treaty Org., NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement 6-7
(May 17, 2010), available at http://www.nato.int/natostatic/assets/pdflpdf_2010_05/
20100517 100517_expertsreport.pdf.
18. Declaration of the Heads of the SCO Member States on International Information
Security, June 15, 2006, unofficial translation available at http://www.fidh.
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Although Russia, China and the United States began official talks
nearly two years ago, 19 state representatives have yet to reach a
consensus as to when a cyber attack rises to the level of an armed
attack and, in turn, when a cyber attack violates international law. 20
Just as the definitions of cyber attacks vary among nations, the
variety of hostile activities capable of being carried out over computer
networks is equally vast, ranging from malicious defacement of
websites to large-scale destruction of SCADA21 infrastructures that
civilians depend upon. The most common cyber tools employed by
private and state hackers are Structured Query Language ("SQL") code
injection, Distributed Denial of Service ("DDoS"), and Worms. While
many of these cyber tools characterize recent developments in cyber
espionage and the use of each tool alone does not result in damage,
their objective and combined use can quickly breed an atmosphere of
war. Keeping the United States effects-based approach in mind, the
following descriptions illustrate the wide-range and scope of recent
org/IMG/articlePDF/article-all315.pdf. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, an
intergovernmental mutual-security organization founded in 2001 by Russia and China,
appears to have adopted an expansive vision of cyber-attacks to include the use of cybertechnology to undermine political stability. The organization has "express[ed] concern
about the threats posed by possible use of [new information and communication]
technologies and means for the purposes [sic] incompatible with ensuring international
security and stability in both civil and military spheres." See CARR, supra note 10, at 1-10.
19. See John Markoff & Andrew E. Kramer, In Shift, U.S. Talks to Russia on Internet
Security, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/12/13/science/13cyber.html; Claudine Beaumont, US and Russia in "Secret"
Cyber
Warfare Talks,
TELEGRAPH
(Dec.
14,
2009),
http://www.telegraph
.co.uk/technology/news/6808883/US-and-Russia-in-secret-cyber-warfare-talks.html; Cheng
Guangjin, US Official Rules Out Chance of "Cyber War" with China, CHINA DAILY (Oct.
20, 2011), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/us/2011-10/20/content_13938436.htm. In 2009, the
United States began talks with Russia and a United Nations arms control committee
about limiting the militarization of cyberspace. The United States has also been holding
discussions with China over the last two years as well.
20. Diane Bartz & Paul Eckert, U.S. and China Face Vast Divide on Cyber Issues,
REUTERS (July 14, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/14/us-usa-china-cyberidUSTRE76D3KO20110714; Guangjin, supra note 19; John Markoff, Step Taken to End
Impasse Over Cybersecurity Talks, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2010, at A7, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/17/world/17cyber.html.
A group of cyber security
specialists and diplomats representing fifteen countries agreed on a set of
recommendations to the United Nations Secretary General for negotiations on an
international computer security treaty, but was subsequently rejected by the United
States for censorship concerns. Two years later at the 2011 annual cabinet-level U.S.China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the conference included cyber security for the
first time, but produced no breakthroughs. Bilateral discussions between the United
States, China, and Russia are ongoing.
21. SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) generally refers to industrial
control systems (ICS): computer systems that monitor and control industrial,
infrastructure, or facility-based processes. See Donald B. Ashton & Daniel W Nagala,
SCADA, PIPELINE AND GAS TECHNOLOGY, Nov.[Dec. 2004, at 26-27; Graham Nasby &
Matthew Phillips, SCADA Standardization,INTECH, May/June 2011, at 18.
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attacks, emphasizing that their objective use transforms them beyond
tools for espionage and into weapons of war.

SQL Code Injection
Long used as an essential part of any hacking activity, the dangers
of SQL code injection became known to the public in 2011 when online
group Lulzsec shutdown the Sony Playstation Network for over a
month. 22 SQL code, an international programming language designed
for managing data in relational database management systems
("RDBMS"),23 serves as the current industry-standard for website
database language. 24 However, such standardization of web sites makes
it easy for hackers to gain access to multiple databases as the Achilles'
heel of one website is often the same as another. SQL injections alter
the predefined logical expressions within a predefined query by
injecting operations which always result in true or false statements. 25
In turn, hackers can run random SQL queries and extract sensitive
user information from applications or bypass security mechanisms and
compromise the backend of server or network.26 Hackers utilizing SQL
injection techniques may gain legitimate username and password
information to sensitive government databases and aid in intelligence
gathering or espionage activities. However, passive cyber activities that
merely observe or gather data, as previously mentioned, are not
weapons or acts of war. Rather, SQL injection enters the realm of cyber
warfare by operating as a stepping-stone for further cyber attacks: Once
a computer network is infiltrated, a hacker can execute a variety of
attacks, including planting logic bombs or other malicious coding to
damage the computer network.

22. Adam Clark Estes, The Hacks that Mattered in the Year of the Hack, ATLANTIC
WIRE
(Dec.
28, 2011),
http://www.theatlanticwire.com/technology/2011/12/hacksmattered-year-hack/46731.
23. Christine McGeever, Structured Query Language, COMPUTERWORLD, May 15,
2000, at 70. Structured Query Language (SQL) is a programming language designed to
get information out of and put it into a relational database. Queries are constructed from
a command that lets you select, insert, update, and locate data.
24. See, e.g., KEVIN KLINE ET AL., TRANSACT-SQL PROGRAMMING 52 (1999); Orest
Halustchak, Proposed Spatial Data Handling Extensions to SQL, in TOWARDS SQL
DATABASE LANGUAGE EXTENSIONS: FOR GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS 69 (VINCENT
B. ROBINSON & HENRY TOM eds.,1993); DEJAN SARKA, ITZIK BEN-GAN, LuBOR KOLLAR &
STEVE KASS, INSIDE MICROSOFT@ SQL SERVER@ 2008: T-SQL QUERYING 273 (2009).

25. Theodoros Tzouramanis, SQL Code Poisoning: The Most Prevalent Technique for
Attacking Web Powered Databases,in CYBER WARFARE AND CYBER TERRORISM 161 (Lech
J. Janczewski & Andrew M. Colarik eds., 2008).
26. CHRIS ANLEY, NEXT GENERATION SEC. SOFTWARE RESEARCH, ADVANCED SQL
INJECTION IN SQL SERVER APPLICATIONS 3-4 (2002), available at http://www.cgi
security.com/lib/advanced-sqLinjection.pdf.
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DistributedDenial of Service Attacks
DDoS attacks have been the most prevalent form of cyber attack in
recent yearS27 and predated both the 2007 attacks on Estonia and the
2008 Georgian bombings. DDoS attacks use an unknown number of
servers to deny access to a specific site by overloading the network with
28
data packets, thus preventing it from processing legitimate requests.
Using a DDoS attack disguises the attack as a legitimate attempt to
access the server or web site through controlling a collective of
computers at different locations called "zombies." Although current
software can detect basic DDoS attacks, prevention remains extremely
difficult as intrusion software cannot distinguish whether the data
request is an attack or real connection attempt. 29
Although damages from a DDoS attack against a web site range
from user inconvenience from lack of site reliability to the complete
shut down of the server and delay, 30 a strong enough DDoS attack may
effectively serve as the equivalent of a military blockade. Just like the
blockade of East Germany during World War II, the DDoS attacks on
Estonia might also be analogized to a military blockade. For example,
the 2007 DDoS attacks on the government of Estonia were so severe
that the attacks effectively shut down government communications for
weeks, knocking out the emergency lines for hours. 31 Georgia fell under
a similar fate in 2008, when a DDoS attack prevented it from
communicating with the outside world. 32 Though inconvenience and
delay in communications are often not considered acts of war, these
scenarios are analogous to a missile being used to take out a
government's communication center: such a DDoS attack would
constitute an act of war.

Worms
Worms have come to light in recent years with the advent of widescale disabling network attacks, such as the Conficker worm and the
Stuxnet attack on Iran's nuclear reactors. Another threat to cyber
security and military networks across the globe, worms are self-

27. George Disterer et al., Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attacks: Prevention, Intrusion
Detection, and Mitigation, in CYBER WARFARE AND CYBER TERRORISM 262-63 (Lech
Janczewski & Andrew M. Colarik eds., 2008).
28. John Worthy & Martin Fannin, Denial-of-Service: Plugging the Legal Loopholes,
COMPUTER LAW & SECURITY REPORT 194-98 (2007).
29. Disterer et al., supranote 27, at 263.
30. Id.
31. Cyberwarfare: Newly Nasty, ECONOMIST, May 24, 2007, available at
http://www.economist.com/nodel9228757.
32. Jonathan A. Ophardt, Cyber Warfare and the Crime of Aggression: the Need for
Individual Accountability on Tomorrow's Battlefield, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 3, 3-6
(2010).
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replicating malware computer programs, which use a computer network
to send copies of itself to computers on a network, sometimes without
any user intervention.33 Due to the security shortcomings on the target
computer, the worm begins replicating and sending out hundreds or
thousands of copies of itself. Unlike DDoS attacks, the presence of a
worm almost always results in damage to the computer network. 34
Although worms wreak havoc on computer networks, the nature of
worms is rooted in espionage and data gathering through electronic
eavesdropping.35 Worms function primarily by hiding on a computer
and through their presence granting access to the device. While the
presence is not generally enough to cause a problem, worms more often
than not multiply at an unprecedented rate, consuming large amounts
of bandwidth and corrupting computer network performance 36
Over the last half decade, worms have become major tools in
toppling entire computer networks. In the summer of 2010, a computer
worm coined "Stuxnet" had the world's leading cyber security experts
up in arms as the self-replicating computer worm made its way through
computers the world over. The goal of the Stuxnet worm was to
physically, not figuratively, destroy a military target. 37 Believed to be
distantly related to the Conficker3 8 worm, Stuxnet targeted Siemens
industrial software and equipment, specifically the computer systems
that run Iran's main nuclear enrichment facilities, by activating when

33. Kevin Curran et al., Hacking and Eavesdropping, in CYBER WARFARE AND
TERRORISM 308 (Lech Janczewski & Andrew M. Colarik eds., 2008).

34. See 0. Toutonji & S. Yoo, An Approach against a Computer Worm Attack, 1.2
INT'L J. COMM. NETWORKS AND INFORMATION SEC. 47, 53 (2009); R.D. VINES, WIRELESS
SECURITY ESSENTIALS, DEFENDING MOBILE SYSTEMS FROM DATA PIRACY 200 (2002).
35. Curran et al., supra note 33.
36. United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 505 (2d Cir. 1991). The Morris worm on
November 2, 1988, was one of the first computer worms distributed via the Internet.
According to its creator, the Morris worm was not written to cause damage, but to gauge
the size of the Internet. A supposedly unintended consequence of the code, however,
caused it to be more damaging: a computer could be infected multiple times and each
additional process would slow the machine down, eventually to the point of being
unusable.

37. William J. Broad, et al., Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear
Delay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2011, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html?_r=3&pagewanted=all.
38. Protect Yourself from the Conficker Worm, MICROSOFT (Apr. 4, 2009),
http://www.microsoft.com/security/pc-security/conficker.aspx; John Markoff, Worm Infects
Millions of Computers Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, at A12, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/23/technology/internet/23worm.html;
John
Markoff,
Defying Experts, Rogue Computer Code Still Lurks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2009, at Al,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/27/technology/27compute.html. Conficker
uses flaws in Windows software to co-opt machines and link them into a virtual computer
that can be commanded remotely by its authors. With more than five million of these
zombies now under its control - government, business and home computers in more than
200 countries.
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the worm detected the presence of a specific configuration of Siemens
controller that appear to exist only in a centrifuge plant.39 Creators of
Stuxnet designed the computer worm to remain inert long periods
before accelerating the spinning rotors in the centrifuges beyond the
burst frequency, resulting in both the bearings and tubes of the rotors
breaking. 40 Stuxnet also included a man-in-the-middle code that sent
out false industrial process control signals, rendering the aberrant
behavior undetectable to diagnostic systems. 41 In turn, the man-in-themiddle code prevented the safety system from engaging, which would
shut down the centrifuge plant before self-destruction.
As demonstrated in the preceding paragraphs, cyber tools, like
Stuxnet and the wide-scale DDoS attacks on Estonia, have the potential
to inflict massive amounts of damage on a state computer network, or
even a nuclear reactor. On their own, these tools of the hacker trade
may look like espionage activities, but used in conjunction and with the
right intent, may bring about effects similar or equivalent to those of an
armed attack. Recognizing that cyber tools can rise to the level of armed
attacks, the next issue facing the United States and the international
community is how to regulate and limit the use of this technology in the
fifth domain of battle, cyberspace.
In the last fifty years, the control of the production and use of
certain weapons has taken on increasing urgency as technological
progress during the Cold War opened doors for the development of far
more devastating weapons than any means of prior conventional
warfare. 42 In the post-WWII environment, arms control treaties have
burgeoned, prohibiting or regulating under the Law of Armed Conflict
the use of new weaponry developments ranging from chemical and
biological, to nuclear arms. 4 3 As little to no difference exists between
benevolent and malevolent coding 44 and the use of coding is available to
anyone with a computer, completely banning these cyber weapons
remains highly unlikely and equally ineffective. Cyber weapons, with
their increasing propensity for harms to state infrastructure and
computer networks, stand posed as the next evolution of warfare and in
turn, weapons governed or prohibited by the Law of Armed Conflict.

39. Broad, et al., supra note 37.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE 304-05 (1983); WILLIAM BOOTHBY,
WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 357 (2009); MICHAEL E. O'HANLON &
MICHAEL A. LEVI, THE FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL 1-12 (2004).
43. O'HANLON & LEVI, supra note 42, at 62, 159.
44. J. Morales et al., Symptoms-Based Detection of Bot Processes, Proceedings of the
Mathematical Methods, Models and Architectures for Computer Network Security
Conference (Sept. 7-10, 2010).
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II. THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AND CYBER WARFARE

The Law of Armed Conflict is the legal corpus comprised of the
Geneva Conventions and the Hague Conventions, as well as subsequent
treaties, case law, and customary international law. 45 The Law of
Armed Conflict "arises from a desire among civilized nations to prevent
unnecessary suffering and destruction while not impeding the effective
waging of war." 4 6 A part of public international law, the Law of Armed
Conflict regulates armed hostilities and applies to military operations
and related activities conducted during an international armed
conflict.47 In the case of cyber attacks, the form and degree of network
attacks are a major factor in determining whether a nation may
respond by force in self-defense. The language used to develop these
rules does not easily translate into cyberspace so there is no common
understanding on how they will apply to this new war-fighting domain.
Not only must Internet activity rise to the level of an armed attack
under the Law of Armed Conflict, but must also meet the required
elements of necessity, proportionality, and attribution.
Serving as the pillar of the right to self-defense within the Law of
Armed Conflict, Article 51 of the U.N. Charter provides for the right of
countries to engage in military action in self-defense, including
collective self-defense, if they come under an "armed attack" from
another state.48 If the attack is real or the threat has proceeded beyond
the point of no return, the victim state of a cyber attack, without any
alternative means, may use self-defense to justify reasonable,
necessary, and proportional measures to maintain the security of the
state under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. 49 In turn, the armed attack
requires a precondition that the use of force produces or is liable to
produce serious consequences. When no such results materialize,
Article 51 does not come into play. However, many nations, particularly
members of the U.N. Security Council, have yet to arrive at a consensus

45. GARY SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 7-10 (2010); What is International
Humanitarian Law?, INT'L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, 1 (July 2004),

http://www.icrc.orgenglassets/files/other/what-isihl.pdf.
46. Solis, supra note 45; Leslie Green, What is--Why is there- the Law of War?, in 71
INTERNATIONAL LAw STUDIES: THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM
141, 161 (Schmitt & Green eds., 1998); Thomas W. Pittman & Linda S. Murnane, The
Law of Armed Conflict in Modern Warfare, 42 JUDGES' J. 18, 18 (2003).
47. SOLIS, supra note 45, at 23; ROBERT KOLB & RICHARD HYDE, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS 65 (2008); William Taft, The Law of
Armed Conflict after 9/11: Some Salient Features,28 YALE J. INT'L L. 319, 319 (2003).
48. U.N. Charter art. 51.
49. JEFFREY CARR & LEWIS SHEPHERD, INSIDE CYBER WARFARE: MAPPING THE CYBER
UNDERWORLD 56 (2009).
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on what the right to self-defense means in the event of an attack on a
country's computer networks.50
In determining whether a cyber attack constitutes an armed attack
warranting self-defense, any examination under Article 51 must also
consider Articles 41 and 42. Article 41 lists measures "not involving the
use of armed force," including "complete or partial interruption .

.

. of

telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication."5 1 Since Article
41 describes actions not involving the use of force, a cyber attack
initially does not appear to fall into the category of armed attack.
However, this ignores the vast propensity described in Part I of this
paper for a cyber attack to wreck wide-spread damage and harm on
vital civilian and military networks, resulting in equally or more
devastating harm than that brought about by more traditional modes of
warfare.
If a cyber attack is determined to have risen to the level of an
armed attack, the response of the state must be necessary, proportional,
and attributive. 52 In its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the International Court of Justice stated,
"the submission of the exercise of the right of self-defense to the
conditions of necessity and proportionality is a rule of customary
international law" and "this dual condition applies equally to Article 51
of the Charter, whatever the means of force employed."5 3 Necessity
entails that the state invoking self-defense establish that a genuine
armed attack, not an accident or mistake, was launched by a particular
country and that the immediacy of the danger provides no reasonable
alternative means for responding. 54 However, the condition of necessity
is inherent in responding to any state-sponsored cyber attack; all cyber
attacks call for immediate self-defense if there is any chance for the
extremely destructive potential of cyber tools to be stopped from
spreading into the civilian realm or wreck wide-spread damage.
Under the Law of Armed Conflict, the proportionality doctrine
forbids the use of any kind or degree of force that exceeds that required
to fulfill the military objective.55 Article 51(5)(b) of the U.N. Charter
codifies proportionality and directs that attacks on a specific military
objective are impermissible if they "may be expected to cause incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
50. Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of
Article 2(4), 36 YALE J. INT'L L. 421, 426-27 (2011).
51. U.N. Charter art. 41.
52. CARR, supra note 18, at 56.
53. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, 245 (July 8).
54. Beth M. Polebaum, National Self-Defense in International Law: An Emerging
Standard for a Nuclear Age, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 187, 198 (1984).
55. Id. at 198-200.

632

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 40:4

combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."5 6 A responsible
state actor intent on a particular target must then first determine if it
is a military objective, and then whether the collateral damage from
destruction of the target is proportionate to the military advantage of
destroying it.57 These articles do not entirely prohibit civilian casualties
under international law, but rather attempt to minimize the number of
civilian casualties as much as possible and ensure that any injury is
sufficiently justified.5 8 In preparation for an attack, Article 57 requires
planners to "take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and
methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to
minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and
damage to civilian objects."5 9 In other words, if a weapon cannot
discriminate between military and civilian objects, the use of such
weapon is illegitimate. 60
Due to the high level of interconnectivity between civilian and
military networks, cyber warfare operations risk producing collateral
damage in the civilian realm that is far beyond the intended effects of
the attack.6 1 Regardless of whether cyber attacks result in damage
beyond the target computer program or data, the estimated amount of
damage done would need to come from the victim state as the effects on
civilian networks or infrastructure are often not immediately visible. 62
For example, 95 percent of the United States military information
transfers, and 90 percent of major corporation information transfers,
take place or depend on civilian networks. 68 Should a state interfere
56. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 51,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Protocol I].
57. Jefferson D. Reynolds, Collateral Damage on the 21st Century Battlefield: Enemy
Exploitationof the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Struggle for a Moral High Ground, 56
A.F. L. REV. 1, 25 (2005).
58. See Protocol I, supra note 56 (stating an indiscriminate attack is one that an
attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated); Thomas & Murnane, supra
note 46; Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Asymmetric Warfare: How to Respond, 87 INT'L L.
STUD. 463, 470 (2011).
59. Protocol I, supranote 56, art. 57.
60. Id. art. 51(4) (stating that indiscriminate attacks are prohibited and include
attacks that indiscriminate attacks are not directed at a specific military objective,
employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military
objective; or which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be
limited).
61. JASON ANDRESS & STEVE WINTERFIELD, CYBER WARFARE: TECHNIQUES, TACTICS
AND TOOLS FOR SECURITY PRACTITIONERS 233 (2011).
62. Id.
63. Vida M. Antolin-Jenkins, Defining the Parameters of Cyberwar Operations:
Looking for Law in All the Wrong Places?, 51 NAVAL L. REV 132, 132-33 (2005).
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with a military information transfer, the attack could easily spillover
into civilian communications by sheer virtue of occurring on the same
computer network.
While the effects of a proposed cyber attack may be difficult to
estimate, ascertaining or gauging the extent of damage to civilians is
not impossible. In fact, cyber attacks generally target a specific
database or network through code design. Although criticized for
allowing a specifically targeted attack to enter into public networks
around the globe, 64 the creators of Stuxnet could feasibly have refined
65
In
the coding so as not to spread outside the intended network.
addition to code design, deleting military files, or even disabling
military computer networks, would limit damages to a proper military
target. Combining these aforementioned activities with proper
intelligence gathering and operational planning, the state hacker could
restrict their activities to military networks and avoid networks
dedicated solely to medical or other public facilities. Otherwise, the
cyber attacks will likely be indiscriminate and spillover into the civilian
realm.
Even if a response meets the requirements of proportionality and
necessity, an attack must be attributable to a state because the laws
governing an action of self-defense depend upon whether the attacker is
a nation-state or a non-state actor.66 Generally, the international law of
self-defense prohibits the use of force by a victim state, unless the act of
aggression can be conclusively attributed to a state or an agent
thereof.6 7 As the Article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force applies only
64. Michael Gross, A Declaration of Cyber-War, VANITY FAIR (Apr. 2011),
http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/features/2011/04/stuxnet-201104; Gregg Keizer, Secrets
of the Stuxnet Worm's Travels, COMPUTERWORLD (Oct. 3, 2010), http://www.pc
world.comlarticle/206822/secretsofthestuxnet_worms travels.html?tk=hpnew
(explaining that Stuxnet was aimed at a specific target list, but spread to thousands of
PCs outside Iran, in countries including China, Germany, Kazakhstan, and Indonesia);
John Markoff, A Silent Attack, but Not a Subtle One, NY TIMES, Sept. 27, 2010, at A6,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/technology/27virus.html?partner-r
at
available
ss&emc=rss; Kim Zetter, How Digital Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet, the Most Menacing
Malware in History, WIRED (July 11, 2011), http://www.wired.com/threatlevell
2011/07/how-digital-detectives-deciphered-stuxnet/all/l.
65. Gregg Keizer, supra note 64; Unraveling Stuxnet, KASPERSKY LABS (Jan. 16,
Senior Antivirus Expert at
2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-5YpwNBTdOl8.
Kaspersky Lab Roel Schouwenberg believes that because an initial infected-USB based
attack failed, the creators of Stuxnet took the risk of it spreading by adding more
functionality to the worm. Liam 0 Murchu, operations manager with Symantec's security
response, agrees with Schouwenberg.
66. Matthew Hoisington, Cyberwarfare and the Use of Force Giving Rise to the Right
of Self-Defense, 32 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 439, 451 (2009).
67. JACKSON NYAMUYA MAOGOTO, BATTLING TERRORISM: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON
THE USE OF FORCE AND THE WAR ON TERROR 169 (2005); Michael Glennon, The Fog of

Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter,
25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 539 (2002); Levi Grosswald, Cyberattack Attribution Matters
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to states and not to individuals, attribution to a state actor is
inescapable.6 8 However, knowledge of the state of origin of a cyber
attack, alone, does not identify the individual, or country, that initiated
the attack.
An experienced hacker can easily hide their tracks by routing
through zombie computers that are hacked or compromised without the
knowledge of the owner, as seen in the attacks on Estonia.6 9 More
recently, a detailed study by the Information Warfare Monitor
uncovered "Ghostnet," a cyber espionage plot based in China that
compromised more than a thousand sensitive government and
commercial computer systems from around the world. 70 The plot
managed to infiltrate computer systems belonging to embassies, foreign
ministries and other government offices in India, London, and New
York City.71 However, the report could not conclude whether the
Chinese government or private hackers working in their own political
interest controlled the plot. At the same time, the report could neither
reject the possibility that a state other than China was behind the plot,
routing through zombie computers in China to "deliberately mislead
observers as to the true operator and purpose of the Ghostnet system." 72
Even with today's highly advanced trace-back and forensic technologies,
the attribution of a cyber attack remains exceedingly difficult.7 3
Consequently, states acting on the legal requirement of attribution
continue to handle transnational cyber attacks as any other criminal
matter on the Internet, resorting to traditional public sector cyber
security measures and leaving investigation and prosecution to the
originating state. However, even the best cyber security framework is
not invincible and countries are often unwilling to investigate.

Under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter,36 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1151, 1155 (2011). Article 51
U.N. Charter requires that the attack be carried out as an "act of a state," which means
that it must be attributable to a state.

68. Eric Talbot Jensen, Computer Attacks on CriticalNational Infrastructure:A Use
ofForce Invoking the Right of Self Defense, 38 STAN. J. INT'L L. 207, 232-35 (2002).

69. Ryan Singel, Zombie Computers Decried as Imminent National Threat, WIRED
(Apr. 9, 2008), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/04/zombie-computer.

70. John Markoff, Vast Spy System Loots Computers in 103 Countries, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 29, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/29/technology/
29spy.html?pagewanted=all.
71. Id.
72. Jack Goldsmith, The New Vulnerability, NEW REPUBLIC (June 7, 2010),
http://www.tnr.com/article/books-and-arts/75262/the-new-vulnerability?page=0,2.

73. Andre Arnes, Identificationand Localization of DigitalAddresses on the Internet,
in CYBER WARFARE AND CYBER TERRORISM 368-69 (Lech J. Janczewski & Andrew M.
Colarik eds., 2008).
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Duties Between States and The Doctrineof Imputability
Given the difficulties raised by the attribution requirement of the
Law of Armed Conflict and increasing fear of another attack similar to
Stuxnet, the international community has seen considerable activity by
various state actors over the last half decade in the pursuit of feasible
options to conclusive attribution. Prior to 1972, state responsibility only
extended to those acts committed through state "agents." 74
International law, nevertheless, started to shift towards a doctrine of
indirect responsibility with the International Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia's seminal opinion on state responsibility in the Tadic case.7 5
In Tadic, the court found that even though the state may not have
directed a particular act, the state still exercised "overall control" for
the actions of combatants.7 6 Although overall control denotes a manner
of direct state control, the Tadic ruling signals a shift in international
law towards holding states responsible for the acts of persons within
their borders.
This shift continued through the last decade with the events of the
September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States. Now, a large
amount of the international community generally accepts that non-state
actors who have committed armed attacks against other states can
impute responsibility onto the state they are operating within.77 This
doctrine of state imputability rests upon the premise of a positive
obligation of states to prevent their territories from being used as safe
havens for not only terrorist attacks, but any attack that would inflict
harm on a foreign state.78 Consequently, U.N. declarations have
increasingly concerned cyber attacks, with the U.N. General Assembly
calling upon states to institute domestic criminal charges for persons
engaging in malicious cyber activity and to take proactive measures to
prevent becoming safe havens for such criminals. 79

74. The Diplomatic and Consular Staff Case (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 29 (May 24).
75. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2,

1995). See also Rachael Lorna Johnstone, State Responsibility: A Concerto for Court,
Council and Committee, 37 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 63 (2008).
76. Tadic 1 70. The court distinguished between state responsibility for individual
actors and responsibility for operations of "organized and hierarchical structured groups,"
such as military units where effective control may not be necessary to carry out state
objectives. The court also drew on the substantial political, military, and financial aid
provided to the combatants. The court found that atrocities only need to be committed in
part with the state resources and that the state have knowledge of the circumstances by
an organ of the state to be responsible.
77. CARR, supra note 18, at 53.
78. TAL BECKER, TERRORISM AND THE STATE: RETHINKING THE RULES OF STATE
RESPONSIBILITY 3 (2006).
79. G.A. Res. 55/63, U.N. Doc. AIRES/55/63 (Dec. 4, 2000).
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The doctrine of state imputability turns upon the requirement of
due diligence, a long held principle of international law.8 0 Under
international law, a state must "use due diligence to prevent the
commission within its dominions of criminal acts against another
nation or its people." 8' Following on this principle, the U.N. General
Assembly maintains that a state has an obligation to prevent and
punish these injurious acts. 2 When the actions of a state do not
conform to this international obligation, that obligation is breached. As
such, a breach of an international obligation is an international wrong
and that state is then responsible to other states for the injury inflicted
as a result of that wrongful act.83 In order to effectively impute
responsibility onto a nation-state for a breach of due diligence, the
victim state must at "minimum examine a sanctuary state's criminal
law dealing with cyber attacks, its enforcement of the law, and its
demonstrated record of cooperation with the victim states' own
investigations and prosecutions of cyber offenders who have acted
across borders." 84 This became a recent political reality when
responsibility for the September 11 attacks by al Qaeda was extended
to the Taliban Government of Afghanistan after evidence revealed that
the Taliban Government following the September 11attacks continued
to provide safe harbor to al Qaeda after multiple warnings to stop.85
Adhering to this rationale, a sanctuary state's indifference to cyber
attacks launched from within its borders and its failure to cooperate
with investigation efforts may very well result in charges of imputed
responsibility.
Admittedly, placing the responsibility on states for cyber attacks
committed within their borders potentially unleashes a Pandora's box of
80. See Robert Perry Barnidge Jr., The Due Diligence Principle Under International
Law, 8 INT'L COMMUNITY L. REv. 81 (2006); Jan Hessbruege, HistoricalDevelopment of
the Doctrines of Attribution and Due Diligence in InternationalLaw, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L.
& POLY 265 (2004).
81. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 (Sept. 7). See also Corfu
Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949, I.C.J. 4, 18 (Apr. 9). The post-Charter court ruled that every
state has an obligation to not knowingly allow its territory to be used for acts contrary to
the rights of other states.
82. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A Res. 56/83, U.N.
Doc. AIRES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002). See also U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. Any state
acquiescing to terrorist activities will be held in violation of Article 2(4).
83. G.A. Res. 56/83, supra note 82, art. 31, para. 1.
84. David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. NAT'L SEC. L & POL'Y
87, 94 (2010).

85. Vincent-Joel Proulx, Babysitting Terrorists.: Should States Be Strictly Liable for
Failingto Prevent TransborderAttacks?, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 615, 619-20 (2005). See
also S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. SIRES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001). Security Council Resolution
1368 includes the harboring of those perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors of terrorist
acts as imputing state responsibility. The term "those" is sufficiently broad to include nonstate actors.
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problems, particularly in determining whether the state initiated
adequate control measures over the hackers. Regardless, the current
status quo is unacceptable; in several recent cases of cyber attacks on
states, countries from which the attacks originated refused to accept
responsibility and even refused to cooperate with investigations. 86
Furthermore, many countries have yet to enact any sort of cyber crime
laws or the existing laws are rendered ineffective through gaps in the
statutory language.8 7 In light of these considerations, the international
community must continue to advocate for greater recognition of each
state's positive duty under international law to actively prevent the use
of its territory for acts harmful to another state and the international
community.
III. THE FUTURE OF U.S. CYBER WAR STRATEGY: BILATERAL TREATIES
Expanding the doctrine of state imputability to attacks waged in
cyberspace requires codification, similar to an arms control treaty,8 8
recognizing the role of computer technology and the Internet to conduct
attacks on other nations within the Geneva Convention and the Law of
Armed Conflict. Much as arms control treaties are used to limit the
damage done in warfare by restricting the usage of new innovative

86. Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to Cyberattacks:A
Justification for the Use of Active Defenses Against States Who Neglect Their Duty to
Prevent, 201 MIL. L. REV. 1, 46 (2009).
87. Jonah Fisher, Efforts to steer young Nigerians away from cybercrime, BBC (Dec.
15, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16192839; John Leyden, Nigeria Fails
to Enact Cyber Crime Laws, REGISTER (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.theregister.co.uk
/2011/04/01/nigeriacybercrimelawfail;Brazilian justice minister urges inclusion of
cyber crime into criminal code, XINHUA NEWS (June 30, 2011), http://news.xinhuanet.
com/english20lO/world/2011-06/30/c_13957924.htm. Both Brazil and Nigeria continually
rank high for cyber crime, but neither country has a set of cyber crime laws.
88. Paul Wagenseil, Cyberweapons Treaties Might Help Prevent Cyberwar, SECURITY
NEWS DAILY (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.securitynewsdaily.com/cyberweapons-treatiescyberwar-1276/. At the 2011 Hacker Halter cyber security conference, BT chief cyber
security officer, Bruce Schneier, proposed establishing a cyber weapons treaty, crediting
former presidential adviser Richard Clarke for the idea from his 2010 book "Cyber War:
The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It." Schneier claims that just
as there are mechanisms for enforcing nuclear arms and chemical weapons treaties, the
same could be developed for cyber weapons. He recommends a no first use policy,

outlawing unaimed weapons, and mandating weapons that self-destruct at the end of
hostilities. See also Hamish Barwick, Global cyber war treaties urgently needed: Bruce
Schneier, COMPUTERWORLD (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.computerworld.com.aularticle/
406751/global cyber-wartreaties_ urgently-needeLbruce-schneier; Barbara Honegger,
Former Counterterrorism Czar Richard Clarke Calls for New National Cyber Defense
Policy to Prevent a Cyber 9/11, NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCH. NEWS (Dec. 9, 2011),

http://www.nps.edulAbout/News/Former-Counterterrorism-Czar-Richard-Clarke-Calls-for
-New-National-Cyber-Defense-Policy-to-Prevent-a-Cyber-9/11-.html; Bruce Schneier, It
Will Soon be Too Late to Stop the Cyberwars, LONDON FIN. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2010),

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/f863fb4c-fe53-1idf-abac.
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weaponry,8 9 states have a similar interest in limiting the use of cyber
tools in armed conflicts to minimize, or altogether prevent, collateral
damage to civilian populations and damage of both critical
governmental and civil infrastructure. 90 Unfortunately, the United
States and several Security Council members vary widely as to what
activity by a state on the Internet arises to the level of an act of
aggression or armed attack in the digital world. For example, the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, of which members include China
and Russia, asserts cyber war includes the dissemination of information
"harmful to the spiritual, moral and cultural spheres of other states."9 '
Russia maintains that anytime a government promotes ideas on the
Internet with the goal of subverting another country's government that
it has committed an illegal act of aggression under the U.N. Charter. 92
In contrast, the United States would rather not include political acts
that may result in censorship and freedom of speech issues, and instead
focuses on the physical and economic damage and injury caused by
cyber attacks. 93 The United States also remains skeptical of Russian
ideas of an international agreement, since a multilateral treaty could
provide cover for totalitarian regimes to censor the Internet in the
fashion of Egypt and Libya prior to the Arab Spring. 94 This difference in
opinion has led to reluctance by the United States to pursue
multilateral international cyber arms control agreements with both
Russia and China.
Following recent international treaty trends, the United States is
pursuing bilateral treaty agreements to fit the DoD effects-based
89. GUIDO DEN DEKKER, THE LAW OF ARMS CONTROL: INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION

22 (2001). Arms control agreements refer to all agreements between two or more states to
limit or reduce certain categories of weapons or military operations to diminish tensions
and the possibility of conflict.
90. Id. at 1. The international community benefits more from limited warfare than a
peaceful situation in which a state is allowed to pose a serious threat to international
peace. See also Siobhan Gorman, U.S. Backs Talks on Cyber Warfare, WALL ST. J. (June 4,
2010), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703340904575284964
215965730.html Markoff, supra note 19, at Al; Andrew Nagorski, Cyberwar Is Hell,
NEWSWEEK, July 28, 2011, available at http://www.thedailybeast.comlnewsweek/
2010/07/28/cyberwar-is-hell.html. After years of talks that went nowhere, the United
States, Russia, China, India, and several others have agreed to begin cyber war limitation
talks at the United Nations due to the increase in cyber attacks and their transnational
nature.
91. Tom Gielten, Seeing the Internet as an "Information Weapon," NAT'L PUB. RADIO
(Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130052701.
92. Sergei Korotkov, Legal Aspects of Informational Operations, U.N. INSTITUTE FOR
http://www.unidir.org/audio/20081
24,
2008),
RESEARCH
(Apr.
DISARMAMENT
InformationSecurity/08-Korotkov.m3u (last visited Oct. 3, 2011).
93. See Grosswald, supra note 67, at 1158 n. 39.
94. John Markoff & Andrew E. Kramer, U.S. and Russia Differ on a Treaty for
Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/06/28/world/28cyber.html?pagewanted=all.
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approach to cyber warfare.95 Through the course of the last five
decades, the international economic legal regime transformed from one
of multilateralism to that of a bilateral regime, in large part, due to
conflicting national interests, global imbalances and lack of effective
global governance. Presumably, nation-states are rational actors, acting
out of a cost-benefit mindset of absolute and relative gains.96 As
rational actors, nation-states ratify treaties when the anticipated nettransaction benefits are positive for all ratifying parties at the time of
signing.97 However, treaties generally involve transaction costs for
administration, communications, enforcement, and monitoring; all of
which can hamper treaty formation and adherence. Monitoring can be
extremely difficult and costly in larger treaties as each party must
monitor the other in order to guard against treaty violations.9 8 Even
after detecting a violation, the cost of enforcement is generally high and
often uncertain.9 9 If countries anticipate a net gain from adhering to
treaty stipulations, despite changing circumstances, the treaty becomes
self-enforcing. 0 0 While the treaty must be incentive compatible, signing
parties must also perceive a net gain over the threshold transaction

95. White House, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE: PROSPERITY,
SECURITY, AND OPENNESS IN A NETWORKED WORLD (2011), availableat http://www.white
house.gov/sites/default/files/rss-viewer/international-strategy-forscyberspace.pdf.
96. Robert Powell, Absolute and Relative Gains in InternationalRelations Theory, 85
AM. POL. Scl. REV. 1303, 1316 (1991). Both contemporary competing theories of Structural
Realism and Neoliberal Institutionalism focus on the states balancing gains and losses,
however they differ on whether the focus is primarily on absolute or relative gains. Powell
resolves the two systems by arguing that states initially look at absolute gains, but then
consider the future relative losses that affect the gains.
97. Robert E. Scott & Paul B. Stephan, Self-Enforcing InternationalAgreements and
the Limits of Coercion, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 551, 583 (2004).
98. U.S. Costs of Verification and Compliance Under Pending Arms Treaties,
available at http://www.cbo.gov
Congressional
Budget Office, xi-xii (1990),
/ftpdocs/77xx/doc7775/90-CBO-043.pdf. Costs of treaties can be illustrated by the 1990
CBO report on the cost of pending arms treaties. For the five accords together, the total
one-time costs of compliance and on-site inspection would range from $0.6 billion to $3.0
billion in 1990 dollars. Recurring costs, beginning with the first year of implementation
and continuing indefinitely, are estimated to range from $0.2 billion to$0.7 billion per
year for the five accords. More recently, the estimated cost of ratifying the Additional
Protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was estimated at $20 -$30 million in one
time fees, and then a recurring $10-$15 million per year. An estimated $160 million would
go to the salaries of 230 inspectors and 200 administrative personnel. See also The Cost of
Implementing the Additional Protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Budget Office (2004), http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index
Weapons, Congressional
=5160&type=O.
99. George Downs & Michael Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and InternationalLaw,
31 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 104 (2002); Andrew Guzman, The Design of International
Agreements, 16 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 579, 590 (2005).
100. Todd Sandler, Treaties: Strategic Considerations,2008 U. ILL. L. REV 155, 157
(2008); Scott Barrett, Self-Enforcing InternationalEnvironmental Agreements, 46 OXFORD
ECON. PAPERS 878 (1994).

640

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 40:4

costs. Consequently, nonparticipating nations to a multilateral treaty
risk altogether negating the net gains of the treaty.
Nonparticipating states are considered sine qua non'0 1 states by
some academics as the absence of their participation gives the law no
realistic meaning.102 These states are pertinent to achieving the
objectives of the treaty for without them, there is no restriction or
change regarding the cause of the problem. 0 3 Support for the necessity
of sine qua non states can be found in recent political and legal reality.
For example, in recent years, nations have attempted to create regional
agreements to fight terrorism by agreeing not to provide their
territories as safe havens for such activities.104 A single nation,
however, offering sanctuary to terrorists can undermine much of the
gains for states who deny safe havens by allowing such activities to
persist unchecked.105 Other examples of this are found in the area of
environmental law, such as the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (IARPOL) requires the treaty only
enters into force after participation by states that represent over 85
percent of the world's gross merchant tonnage. 0 6 While signatories to
the treaty totaled less than half of the globe, the signatories
represented over 85 percent of the world's major shipping states and in
turn ensured gains by limiting the activities of the biggest polluters.107

101. Latin for "without which not." An indispensable condition or thing; something on
which something else necessarily depends. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009)
102. Gary L. Scott & Craig L. Carr, Multilateral Treaties and the Formation of
Customary InternationalLaw, 25 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY 71, 87 (1997). See also Review
of the Multilateral Treaty-making Process, U.N. Doc. ST LEG SER.B 21, U.N. Sales No. E
F.83.V.8 (1985) (stating that a treaty cannot be effective if not ratified by states whose
participation is crucial for implementation of the provision); Andrew Michie, Provisional
Application of Arms Control Treaties, 10 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 349 (2005). Several major
arms treaties, including the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and the 1963 Partial
Test Ban Treaty, require that their entry into force is conditional upon the adherence of
those states that are militarily or technologically the most significant as the subject
matter of the treaty. Arms control treaties that fail to attract adherence of states actually
possessing weapons have little practical value.
103. Scott & Carr, supra note 102, at 87.
104. See Eric Rosand et a]., The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Regional
and Subregional Bodies: Strengthening a Critical Partnership, CENTER ON GLOBAL
COUNTERTERRORISM
COOPERATION (2008),
available at http://www.globalct.org/
images/content/pdf/reports/strengthening_a_criticalpartnership.pdf.
105. Todd Sandler, Collective Versus Unilateral Responses to Terrorism, 124 PUB.
CHOICE 75, 85-87 (2005). See also Michie, supra note 102 (explaining that the failure of
pertinent states to ratify can compromise the security of those states that become party to
the agreement because it allows the non-signatory parties to pursue a strategic
advantage).
106. Marine Pollution: International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships (MARPOL), Nov. 2, 1973, 34 U.S.T. 3407, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184.
107. List of Contracting Parties to MARPOL Convention, available at
https://imo.amsa.gov.aulpublic/parties/marpol78.html.
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The area of cyber crime further reflects this reality as many countries
have been hesitant to sign the Convention on Cyber Crime following
Russia and China's refusals to sign. 08 As China and Russia serve as
the two main hubs for international cyber crime and activity, their
absence from the treaty arguably negates the gains in failing to manage
the source of the problem. 109 NATO has recommended pushing
"notable" non-participants Russia and China to sign onto the
Convention on Cyber Crime as a recommended cyber defense
initiative.1 0 In sum, no net gains exist if the cause of the problem is not
part of the agreement and bound by restrictions.
With China, Russia, and the United States unable to reach a
consensus, a multilateral international treaty on cyber war currently
seems implausible. However, their absence does not mean that states
have no options to build a regulatory regime for cyber warfare. While
establishing accepted international norms for behavior on the Internet
requires time, bilateral treaties provide an alternative to allowing the
global community to act arbitrarily as to their own views of cyber
warfare. Bilateral treaties not only codify existing customary
international law, but also "begin an evolution that creates it."111 As it
currently stands, the United States has committed itself to working
"with like-minded states to establish an environment of expectations or
norms of behavior, that ground foreign and defense polices and guide
international partnerships."11 2 The United States viewpoint is that only
after governments widely come to a general consensus will analysts be
able to develop coordinated policy recommendations and will countries
be able to act multilaterally to create a sufficient treaty. In turn, the
United States has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with India
on Cyber Attacks and added an extension to the Australia, New
Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS or ANZUS Treaty)
that extension allows the United States and Australia to use technology

108. Markoff & Kramer, supra note 94.
109. Lolita C. Baldor, U.S. Report Blasts China, Russia For Cyber Crime, USA TODAY
(Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/technology/story/2011-11-03/
Cyber-attacks/51058852/1. The United States has known for years, but finally publicly
announced that China and Russia are responsible for harboring cyber crimes and stealing
sensitive United States technology data in an attempt to highlight the risks of cyber
attacks in a growing high-tech society.
110. Sverre Myrli, 173 DSCFC 09 E bis - NATO and Cyber Defense - 2009 Annual
Session, 1 64, available at http://www.nato-pa.int/default.Asp?SHORTCUT=1782.
111. M. Cherif Bassiouni, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: MULTILATERAL AND
BILATERAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 127 (2008).
112. White House, supra note 95, at 9. The United States is currently prepared to
build bilateral and multilateral partnerships, to work with regional organizations, and to
collaborate with the private sector.
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to cooperate in the event of a large-scale cyber attack. 113 The United
States has chosen to first pursue bilateral arms-control and defense
treaties since multilateral treaties are inherently harder to monitor and
figure out which states follow their obligations, rather than hiding
behind the guise of proxies. 114 In turn, the United States posits itself to
quickly determine which countries will be not only accept their
definition of cyber warfare, but also adhere to the guidelines being
established.
While the turning point for Russia and China is the dissemination
of information harmful to "political, economic, and social systems" as
well as "spiritual, moral and cultural," 115 parties to a multilateral treaty
could feasibly tackle these discrepancies in the future by treaty
reservations or reaching a compromise. However, such resolutions of
divergent views on cyber attacks cannot be resolved for a country
housing one of the largest cyber commands: Iran. The Iranian
government blames the United States and Israel for the release of the
debilitating Stuxnet work into its nuclear reactor computer networks.11 6
Exactly who created Stuxnet remains unproven, but many experts now
acknowledge the high likelihood that Israel was behind the attack,
possibly aided by the United States. 117 As a result, Iran believes that
the United States and Israel initiated the first stages of cyber war,
setting the stage for Iran to create their own cyber command to respond
to a future Stuxnet.11 s Part of the mission of Iran's new cyber command
is the implementation of "retaliatory measures" against a host of
nations the Iranian government deems hostile, including the United
States and Israel. 119 In fact, Iranian engineers claim the recent drone
"crash" in Iran is the beginning of cyber attacks by the Iranian cyber

113. See Press Release, United States and India Sign Cybersecurity Agreement, DEP'T
OF HOMELAND SEC. (July 19, 2011), http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/20110719-usindia-cybersecurity-agreement.shtm.
114. Clarke, supra note 10, at 235, 237. See also Gabriella Blum, Bilateralism,
Multilateralism,and the Architecture of InternationalLaw, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 323, 35157 (2008).
115. Tom Gjelten, Seeing the Internet as an "Information Weapon," NAT'L PUB. RADIO
(Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=130052701.
116. Broad, supra note 37; Stuxnet Worm Hits Iran Nuclear Plant Staff Computers,
BBC (Sept. 26, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11414483. Following
Stuxnet, Mahmoud Liayi, head of the information technology council at the ministry of
industries announced to the press that "an electronic war has been launched against
Iran." See also Gross, supra note 64.
117. Broad, supra note 37.
118. Atul Aneja, Under Cyber-attack, Says Iran, HINDU (Sept. 26, 2010),
http://www.thehindu.com/news/internationallarticle797363.ece.
119. Ilan Berman, Iranian Cyberwar: U.S. Must Prepare for Possible Confrontation,
DEFENSENEWs (Sept. 11, 2011), http://mobile.defensenews.com/story.php?i=7650158.
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command to hijack and redirect the drones. 120 Following the drone
crash, Iran removed 90 percent of all websites to a local server to
protect against anticipated cyber attacks. 121 These factors combined
with the fact that the United States has not had formal diplomatic
relations with Iran in over three decades,122 contribute to the
unlikelihood that Iran will participate in any multilateral treaty or
bilateral treaty involving the United States.
Due to their contribution and potential to wage cyber attacks, Iran
is a net loss for any international multilateral cyber warfare treaty.
Rather than view Iran's absence from the treaty as destroying its
effectiveness, the United States can mitigate the loss with net gains
through collective defense and creating international intolerance for
certain conduct when engaging in cyber warfare. As Iran now houses
one of the largest cyber commands in the world and have stated their
intent to implement "retaliatory measures" against hostile nations, it is
even more imperative that widespread international norms and
guidelines are established before the United States or any other nation
is put in the position of another Estonia.

120. Rick Gladstone, Iran Complains to Security Council About Spy Drone, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 10, 2011, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/10/world/middleeast/
iran-complains-to-security-council-about-spy-drone.html?ref-iran; Adam Rawnsley, Iran's
Alleged Drone Hack: Tough, but Possible, WIRED (Dec. 14, 2011), www.wired.com/
dangerroom/2011/12/iran-drone-hack-gps. Iran claims to have managed to jam the drone's
communication links to American operators by forcing it to shift into autopilot mode. With
its communications down, the drone allegedly kicked into autopilot mode, relying on GPS
to fly back to base in Afghanistan. With the GPS autopilot on, the engineer claims Iran
spoofed the drone's GPS system with false coordinates, fooling it into thinking it was close
to home and landing into Iran's clutches.
121. Ramin Mostafavi, Iran Moves Websites to Guard Against Cyber Attacks, REUTERS
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/20/us-iran-internet2011),
20,
(Dec.
idUSTRE7BJ1VB20111220; Iran Hosts Local Websites to Avoid Cyber Attacks, XINHUA
NEWS (Dec. 21, 2011), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/scil2011-12/21/c_131319
917.htm. Iran's deputy minister for communications and information technology said that
the Islamic republic transferred the locations more than 30,000 Iranian websites from
foreign-based hosting agencies to new computer facilities inside the country to avert
potential cyber attacks.
122. Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Background Note: Iran, U.S DEP'T OF STATE (Feb.
1, 2012), http://www.state.gov/r/paleilbgn/5314.htm; Lionel Beehner, Timeline: U.S.-Iran
Contacts, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Mar. 9, 2007), http://www.cfr.org/iran/
timeline-us-iran-contacts/pl2806. Following the Iranian Hostage Crisis in 1979, on April
7, 1980, the United States broke diplomatic relations with Iran, and on April 24, 1981, the
Swiss Government assumed representation of United States interests in Tehran. Due to
exchanging
of
instead
countries,
two
the
between
relations
poor
ambassadors Iran maintains an interests section at the Pakistani embassy in
Washington, D.C., while the United States, since 1980, has maintained an interests
section at the Swiss embassy in Tehran.
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IV. POST NORMALIZATION OF CYBER WARFARE: U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL
IMPACTS

While the creation of norms for the realm of cyber warfare is
imperative, conflating cyber conflicts with the language of war poses
dangers for the future of the Internet and how Americans everywhere
use it. Following the passing of the Patriot Act, government agencies
have expanded their ability to control the Internet and monitor
computer use under the guise of the War on Terror. 123 Should the
United States government officially announce the onset of a "Cyber
War," the American public could quickly witness the militarization of
the Internet, where traditional notions of freedom of information are
displaced by national security concerns. 124
Although there is no direct reference or declaration on rights to
privacy in the United States Constitution, the American people have
come to expect at the very least the right "to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizure." 125
The framers of the Constitution intended the Fourth Amendment as a
prohibition on law enforcement from gathering more information than
is required, but unfortunately, the phrase "unreasonable" was never
well defined, and its definition has become increasingly blurred by the
normative idea of what level of privacy a person should expect with the
technological advances of the last century.126 For example, the Supreme

Court ruled in United States Telecommunications Association v. FCC
that the Fourth Amendment protects digits that convey context,' 27
however Title II of the Patriot Act (Enhanced Surveillance Procedures)
was passed in part to allow for the FBI to run packet-sniffing software
to intercept email sent by a suspect. 128 The software can be configured
123. See Laurie Thomas Lee, The USA Patriot Act and Telecommunications: Privacy
Under Attack, 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 371, 373-78 (2003); Sunya Kashan,
The USA PatriotAct: Impact on Freedoms and Civil Liberties, 7 ESSAI 87, 88 (2010).
124. See William J. Lynn III, The Pentagon's Cyberstrategy, One Year Later, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS (Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68305/william-j-lynniiilthe-pentagons-cyberstrategy-one-year-later?page=show (referencing William J. Lynn
III, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Remarks on the Department of Defense Cyber Strategy
(July 14, 2011), available at www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1593).
Ninety percent of United States military voice and Internet communications travel over
the same private networks that service private homes and businesses.
125. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
126. Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh
Away: The Century of Fourth Amendment "Search and Seizure" Doctrine, 100 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 933, 1020 (2010); Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the
Internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1006-07 (2010).
127. United States Telecom Ass'n v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n, 227 F.3d 450 (D.C. Cir.
2010).
128. Stefanie Olsen, Patriot Act Draws Privacy Concerns, CNET (Oct. 26, 2001),
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-275026.html. See also Tom Cohen, Obama Approves
Extension of Expiring Patriot Act Provisions, CNN (May 27, 2011), http://articles
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either to record the email content, which are arguable digits that
convey a plethora of personal context. 129 Beyond allowing the FBI to
intercept emails, Title II of the Patriot Act covers all aspects of the
surveillance of suspected terrorists, those suspected of engaging in
computer fraud or abuse, and agents of a foreign power who are
engaged in clandestine activities.iso Specifically, Title II authorizes
government agencies to gather "foreign intelligence information" from
both U.S. and non-U.S. citizens. 3 1 As Title II of the Patriot Act is still
in effect and allows for a government agency to at-will monitor a
person's e-mails, Congress could very well create another extension or
strengthen the U.S Patriot Act that provide for heightened surveillance
of electronic transmissions from personal computers.
Considering that hundreds of American computers were used
unsuspectingly to wage the DDoS attacks that shut Estonia's
government down for weeks, 132 the FBI and other agencies could
feasibly argue that the risk of infected zombie computers within our
nation's borders should grant the federal government access to monitor
electronic transmissions in order to protect national security
interests. 133 The domino effect this sort of precedent could cause is
.cnn.com/2011-05-27/politics/congress.patriot.act 1_lone-wolf-provision-patriot-actprovisions-fisa-court?_s=PM:POLITICS; David Kravets, Patriot Act Turns 10, With No
Signs of Retirement, WIRED (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel
/2011/10/patriot-act-turns-ten/. Section 505 of the Patriot Act gives the government
powers to acquire phone, banking, and other records via the power of a so-called "national
security letter," which does not require a court warrant. National security letters, perhaps
the most invasive facet of the law, are written demands from the FBI that compel
Internet service providers, financial institutions, and others to hand over confidential
records about their customers, such as subscriber information, phone numbers, and email addresses, and arguably websites you have visited. They require no probable cause
or judicial oversight and also contain a gag order, preventing the recipient of the letter
from disclosing that the letter was ever issued. In addition, the "lone wolf' measure under
Section 207 of the Patriot Act allows FISA court warrants for e-monitoring of non-U.S
citizens, even without showing that the suspect is an agent of a foreign power or a
terrorist. It has never been invoked, but the authority is retained. The provision has been
extended through June 1, 2015.
129. Olsen, supra note 128.
130. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001).
131. Id.
132. Mark Landler & John Markoff, DigitalFears Emerge After Data Siege in Estonia,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
29,
2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/technology/29
estonia.html?pagewanted=all. Estonian officials reported that over a million computers
were used during the 2007 DDoS attacks, including American computers. See also James
Sterngold, U.S. on Guard Against Computer Attacks, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, June
24, 2007, at A4, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/cla/2007/06/24/
MNGCDQKS241.DTL&ao=all.
133. Singel, supra note 69. Department of Homeland Security representative Jordana
Siegel said botnets were imminent threats to national security. See also Ryan Singel, NSA
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frightening: any American computer could be logged into and monitored
for suspicion of being a zombie computer for a future DDoS attack. With
that in mind, cyber warfare tactics and policy need to recognize that
much of the American public, despite the ease millions place private
information onto Facebook, still expect a level of privacy in the home
and at work in this post-September 11 society. In respecting and
honoring the rights of the American people, any resulting domestic
cyber warfare policy needs to take privacy concerns into
consideration.1 34
CONCLUSION

When the Law of Armed Conflict was first codified into the Geneva
Convention, the Internet may as well have been the subject of a science
fiction novel. Now the United States and the international community
are faced with questions of how to apply nearly a century-old charter to
a technology that allows the aggressor to hide behind a veil of
anonymity. Despite this obstacle to enforcing the current Law of Armed
Conflict, cyber warfare remains a serious threat that can no longer be
swept under the proverbial rug. At the onset of the decade, cyber
attacks, with their inherent anonymity and propensity to cause real
transnational harms, pose one of the most serious and evasive
asymmetric threats to the United States and all other members of the
international community, along with terrorism and nuclear
proliferation.1 35 Under the current environment, international peace is
threatened, unless the United States and other nations have the ability
to respond in self-defense to cyber attacks without being restrained by
outdated interpretations of international law governing the right to
Must Examine All Internet Traffic to Prevent Cyber Nine-Eleven, Top Spy Says, WIRED
(Jan. 15, 2008), www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/01/feds-must-exami;

Lawrence Wright,

The Spymaster: Can Mike McConnell Fix America's Intelligence Community?, NEW
YORKER (Jan. 21, 2008), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/01/21/080121fa
fact-wright. Though he later retracted his statement, one of the lead United States spies
initially argued for monitoring all Internet traffic after the attacks on Estonia.

134. Compare IBOPE Zogby International, What is Privacy?Poll Exposes Generational
Divide on Expectations of Privacy, According to Zogby/Congressional Internet Caucus
Advisory Committee Survey, Jan. 31, 2007, http://www.zogby.com/news/2007/01/31/whatis-privacy-poll-exposes-generational-divide-on-expectations-of-privacy-according-tozogbycongre/ (explaining in 2007, IBOPE Zogby found that over 80 percent of Americans
polled were concerned about the security and privacy of their personal information on the
Internet.) with Mary Madden & Aaron Smith, Reputation Management and Social Media,
CENTER (May 2010), http://www.pewInternet.org/Reports/2010/
PEW RESEARCH
is
IBOPE
Zogby's
number
Reputation-Management/Summary-of-Findings.aspx.
comparable with the 2010 Pew Research Center poll that found nearly 44 percent of
adults 18-29 actively take steps to limit the amount of their personal information that is
available online, while 71 percent of social network users actively changed their privacy
settings to limit what is shared.
135. Symposium, Cyber Threats to National Security, CACI INTERNATIONAL (2010).
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respond in self-defense with force. The global and open architecture of
the Internet, while an environment necessary to encourage innovation,
makes defending against cyber attacks an exceedingly onerous task for
state actors; effective international cooperation and trust building are
critical to successfully protecting both state and non-state actors on the
Internet in the years to come.
Although state practice in the aftermath of cyber attacks suggests
widespread condemnation, cyber warfare remains a legal gray zone.
Recently, policy debates on the subject have yielded little consensus in
the way of an agreement on how to address a cyber attack, or even at
what level a cyber attack becomes an armed attack. In the absence of
custom, bilateral treaty regimes may provide a basis for the regulation
of cyber attacks in international law. The regional and bilateral treaty
regimes pursued by the United States not only offer some form of
recourse in the absence of a comprehensive multilateral treaty, but also
begin setting the early stages of precedent, based on their effectiveness,
for a future treaty regime. However, while establishing accepted
international norms through bilateral treaties is useful, doing so does
not provide governments a codified definition of cyber attack or written
guidelines on how states should respond in the event of a foreign-state
taking aggression against them over the Internet. Cyber attacks are by
their very nature transnational; cyber weapons are often designed by
authors in multiple countries to run through computer networks
without respect of state borders in hopes of undermining a computer
system on the other side of the globe. In turn, this global threat can
only be effectively met by increased diplomatic relations between the
United States and the international legal community working together
to solidarize a new treaty regime for cyber attacks.

